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A TAXONOMY OF LAWYER REGULATION: 
How Contrasting Theories of Regulation Explain the Divergent Regulatory 
Regimes in Australia, England/Wales, and North America 
  
NOEL SEMPLE,1 RUSSELL G. PEARCE, 2 RENEE NEWMAN KNAKE3  
ABSTRACT  
What explains the dramatic contrast between legal services regulation in the United States and 
anglophone Canada, on one hand, and England/Wales and Australia, on the other?  In order to help 
explain these divergent regulatory choices, and to further comparative analysis, this Essay proposes a 
taxonomy4
                                                        
1 Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Toronto Faculty of Law (Centre for the Legal Profession).  We are 
very appreciative to the helpful comments of Deborah Rhode, Laurel Terry, Susan Fortney, and the participants in 
the New York Legal Ethics Scholars Roundtable.  We are also grateful for research assistance from Allison Eicher 
as well as comments and editorial assistance from the editors of this journal. 
 of theories of legal services regulation drawn from these common-law jurisdictions.  Although 
most jurisdictions employ a combination of approaches, as well as some hybrid methods, the Essay 
identifies the two dominant perspectives: (1) the professionalist-independent framework, predominate in 
anglophone North America, and (2) the consumerist-competitive framework found in the common law 
jurisdictions of Northern Europe and Australia.  This theoretical divide, in turn, helps explain why the 
United States and Canada have largely adhered to a body of self-regulation focused upon aspirations of 
professionalism and professional independence. Australia and England/Wales, by contrast, have 
embarked upon market-oriented reform that purports to promote consumer protection and consumer 
interests.  In describing this taxonomy, we recognise jurisdictions sometimes employ hybrid regulatory 
strategies that combine elements of the professionalist-independent and consumerist-competitive 
frameworks, such as gatekeeper rules promulgated by the State (as opposed to gatekeeper regulations 
promulgated by judges or the legal profession).  We also acknowledge that regulatory approaches are 
dynamic and that regulators may very well shift perspectives over time.  Nevertheless, organising the 
claims of commentators and regulators into categories will help to promote analysis and comparison of 
legal services regulations, as well as to improve the quality of decision-making by those who craft and 
enforce the rules. We identify, for example, the crucial distinction between how these two approaches 
construct an understanding of legal services clients.  Consumerist-competitive systems identify clients as 
consumers (who are similar to consumers of other goods and services) and apply this perspective to the 
particular context of purchasing legal services.  In contrast, professionalist-independent systems 
understand the experience of a legal services client as fundamentally different from that of other 
consumers and, accordingly, require a wholly distinct regulatory approach. 
2 Edward & Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics, Morality and Religion & Co-Director, Louis Stein Center for 
Law & Ethics, Fordham University School of Law.  
3Associate Professor and Co-Director, Kelley Institute of Ethics & the Legal Profession, Michigan State University 
School of Law. 
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The Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I situates our inquiry in the context of a larger, more fundamental 
question:  why regulate legal services in the first instance?   We identify and describe various theories that 
explain the introduction of regulation, contrasting in particular the private interest (capture) and public 
interest (market failure) approaches. Part II then turns to an exploration of the regulators' normative 
theories on how legal services ought to be regulated.  Here we describe the taxonomy of consumerist-
competitive and professionalist-independent approaches, including how consumerist-competitive 
approaches tend to favour government regulation, market-oriented solutions, firm-level accountability, 
and principles-based regulatory strategies and why professionalist-independent approaches tend to favour 
self-regulation, individual lawyer accountability, and command-and-control regulatory strategies. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Australia and England/Wales5 took a markedly different approach to the regulation of 
legal services than the United States or Canada.  Regulatory efforts in Australia and England/Wales 
provided different responses to changing technological and social conditions with a purported goal of 
enhancing both market competition and innovative regulatory strategies.  By contrast, the American Bar 
Association (ABA), in response to the recent work of the ABA 20/20 Commission, embraced only 
minimal changes related to technology advancements and generally rejected efforts to promote market 
competition and innovation.6   While a few Canadian provinces made similar limited changes, most 
resisted these trends.7
Although a number of scholars and commentators throughout the common law world have noted these 
divergent regulatory responses,
  Instead, anglophone North American jurisdictions generally adhere to a relatively 
traditional system of regulation based on professional independence.  
8
                                                        
5 We refer to England/Wales recognising that the Legal Services Act (2007) generally refers to England and Wales, 
but not the other jurisdictions within the United Kingdom. 
 they have devoted less attention to the justifications that underpin these 
responses.  This Essay proposes a taxonomy of the rationales underlying the contrasting regulatory 
strategies in order to help explain their divergence and to promote comparative analysis.  In doing so, we 
build on the path-breaking work of Richard Abel in offering a taxonomy of sociological theories of the 
6 See ABA Model Rule 1.1, Comment 8 (2012):  ‘To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should 
keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant 
technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements 
to which the lawyer is subject’. (emphasis added to highlight revised language). 
7  Significant reform to rules about alternative business structures is being considered in the provinces of Ontario  
(Alternative Business Structures Working Group, First Report to Convocation (June 27, 2013), (Toronto: Law 
Society of Upper Canada, 2013)  online: LSUC 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147495044> accessed 3 December 2013 and Nova 
Scotia (Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, "2013 – 2016 Strategic Framework," online: 
http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/cms/menu-pdf/strategicframework.pdf > accessed 3 December 2013.  In British 
Columbia, the regulator is examining the question of whether notaries, paralegals, and lawyers should be brought 
under the authority of a single regulator (Law Society of British Columbia, "Public Consultations in Vancouver, 
Victoria and Prince George on Future of Legal Regulation (Press Release, September 5, 2013)," online: 
<http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=3811&t=Public-consultations-in-Vancouver,-Victoria-and-Prince-
George-on-future-of-legal-regulation>  accessed 5 November 2013. 
8 Among the numerous commentaries and publications, legal services regulation is the topic of a new annual 
International Conference of Legal Regulators and a major new monograph (Frank Stephen, Lawyers, Markets and 
Regulation (Edward Elgar, 2013)).  
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legal profession9 and David Wilkins in providing a taxonomy of models for controlling lawyer conduct.10
The Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I situates our inquiry in the context of a larger, more fundamental 
question: why regulate legal services in the first instance?  It contrasts private interest (capture) theories 
relating regulation to supplier self-interest with public interest theories about regulation's value for clients 
and the public.  The private interest theories include both sociological and economic variants, while the 
public interest theories divide into market-failure and legal-ethical accounts.   
 
Our taxonomy classifies strategies for regulating legal services, including economic, sociological, policy, 
and professional perspectives.   
Part II then considers regulators' normative theories of how legal services should be regulated.  Here we 
propose a distinction between a professionalist-independent framework that valorises the professional 
independence of lawyers and focuses on the special, non-consumer interests of clients versus a 
consumerist-competitive framework that focuses on the consumer interests of clients and seeks to 
advance them by fostering competition between legal service providers.  These two frameworks, in turn, 
rely on underlying core values and promote particular regime elements, including (i) occupational 
structure, (ii) governance, (iii) regulatory posture toward people other than legal services licensees, and 
(iv) level of regulatory focus (individual versus firm).  In anglophone North America, the professionalist-
independent model is the dominant, although not exclusive strategy, while England/Wales and Australia 
generally employ the consumerist-competitive approach.   
But while a particular approach may be dominant, most jurisdictions do not rely exclusively on one or the 
other and may shift their reliance from one regime to another over time.   For example, while legal 
services regulators in the United States generally apply a professionalist-independent approach, a few 
jurisdictions have begun to apply a consumerist-competitive approach to permit licensed paralegals.11  
Similarly, England/Wales generally employs consumerist-competitive strategy but maintains a system of 
self-regulating front line regulators based upon a professionalist-independent model.12  Jurisdictions also 
employ hybrid frameworks, such as a professionalist-regulatory model that combines professionalist 
assumptions regarding lawyer capabilities with consumerist disregard for self-regulation and includes 
gatekeeping legislation and common law malpractice doctrine.13
We intend our taxonomy of current regulatory approaches to assist scholars and regulators alike as they 
evaluate merits of existing regulation and consider proposals for reform.
  
14
                                                        
9 Richard Abel, American Lawyers (Oxford University Press, 1989) 14-39.  Abel divides sociological theories of the 
legal profession into Weberian, Marxist, and structural-functionalist categories. 
  For purposes of this Essay, we 
10 David B. Wilkins, ‘Who Should Regulate Lawyers?’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 799.  Wilkins identifies 
‘compliance arguments’ and ‘independence arguments’ and argues for a contextual approach to calibrating the use 
of compliance and independence approaches. 
11  See discussion infra (n 160).  
12 See discussion infra (n 161). 
13 See discussion infra (n 162). 
14 Significant changes can be seen in legal services regulatory regimes across the common law world. For example, 
consider the very short period which elapsed between the implementation of the Legal Services Act 2007 in fall 
2011 and the call for another major overhaul just two years later in fall 2013.  See Owen Bowcott, 'Labyrinthine 
legal services regulation 'needs to be streamlined'' (The Guardian, first published 10 September 2013)   
www.theguardian.com/law/2013/sep/10/legal-services-board-labyrinthine-regulation (last accessed 23 October 
2013).   Similarly, shortly after the ABA 20/20 Commission declined to engage in meaningful reform related to 
nonlawyer ownership, multidisciplinary partnerships, and limited license legal technicians or similar efforts to 
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do not take a normative position on the relative merits of the contrasting approaches.15
PART I:  WHY REGULATE LEGAL SERVICES? 
  Rather, we seek to 
clarify and facilitate analysis of legal services regulation as well as to improve the quality of decision-
making by those who craft and enforce the rules. 
The development of a taxonomy of legal services regulation begins with the question of why we regulate 
legal services in the first instance.  Part I identifies and briefly summarises the justifications advanced for 
regulation of the legal profession across jurisdictions, including economic private interest theory, 
sociological private interest theory, market failure public interest theory, and legal-ethical public interest 
theory.  Interestingly, the competing regulatory regimes in many ways are also rooted in a common goal 
of protection for clients (or consumers) but each aims to accomplish this goal via dissimilar means.  For 
example, as we discuss below, client protection for North American regulators is grounded in 
preservation of autonomy for legal services practitioners and the legal profession, often framed as 
‘professional independence’,16
1.1 Private Interest Theories 
 to ensure loyalty and fidelity to the client and to avoid the influence of a 
competing interest such as a non-lawyer partner in the law practice.  By contrast, client protection for 
Australia and England/Wales is drawn from consumer protection principles.    Part I concludes by 
observing that while some of these theories provide a justification for different regulatory approaches, 
others merely offer critique. 
According to the private interest theory of legal services regulation, rules are created in order to protect 
the interests of lawyers.  This is an application of the capture theory of regulation, which holds that 
regulation is typically ‘acquired’ by the regulated group, and ‘designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit’.17
1.1.1 Economic Private Interest Theory 
  Economists and critical sociologists have developed distinct versions of the private interest 
theory, but their shared premise is that provider self-interest typically explains observed regulation.  The 
private interest critique implicates all regulated occupations (especially self-regulating ‘professions’), but 
it has also been specifically and forcefully applied to lawyers.  
The economic critique of occupational regulation began where modern economics itself began: in 1776, 
with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Smith suggested that the true purpose of mandatory 
apprenticeships in that era was the suppression of competition.18  He also denounced self-regulatory 
occupational groups as natural fora for ‘conspiracy against the public’ and ‘contrivance to raise prices’.19
                                                                                                                                                                                  
liberalise who may practice certain segments of law, a number of states have embarked on formal exploratory 
endeavors to assess these and related reforms. Regarding changes in Canada, see n 
 
7, supra. 
15 For the purposes of this Essay, legal services regulation includes only rules enforceable by the State or by a body 
with state-recognised powers. 
16 For example, ABA Model Rule 5.4 is titled ‘Professional Independence of a Lawyer’.  
17 George J. Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 3. 
18 Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (1776), Book I, Chap. 10, Part II. 
19  Ibid. 
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The subsequent economic literature in this field may be understood as an elaboration and empirical 
buttressing of Smith’s views.20   A major contribution came with George Stigler's ‘regulatory capture’ 
concept in 1971.  Stigler argued that economic groups consistently seek to enrich themselves by securing 
the state’s coercive power to limit competition and fix prices.21  Very soon after this idea became 
ascendant, its applicability to professional self-regulation was recognised.22  While the members of an 
economic group must typically exert some effort to capture a state regulatory agency and bend it to their 
interests, a self-regulator controlled by members of the occupational group is effectively 'pre-captured'.23 
Self-regulation gives an occupational group carte blanche to manipulate regulation in order to enrich 
itself.24
To rebut arguments that regulation serves the public interest,
   
25 economists in this school point to evidence 
that regulation of legal services and other occupations is excessive, ineffectual or unnecessary to protect 
consumers.26  They posit that the goal of occupational self-regulators (such as the American attorney 
licensing and disciplinary authorities or the Canadian law societies) is, instead, to maximise economic 
rents (artificially created transfers) for the members of the group.27  Rent-seeking can take the form of 
‘ethics’ rules which reduce competitive behaviour.   For example, prohibitions on multi-disciplinary 
practices and nonlawyer ownership or investment in law practices are understood as mechanisms to 
suppress competition and reserve profits for members of the legal profession,28 as are limitations on 
advertising and client solicitation.29                                                        
20 Benjamin H. Barton, ‘Economists on Deregulation of the American Legal Profession: Praise and Critique’ (2011) 
2011 Michigan State Law Review 493. 
 
21 See Stigler (n 17) 4-7. 
22 See Stephen (n 8) Chapter 7.   
23 Anthony Ogus, ‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97; Javier Núnez, ‘Can 
Self Regulation Work?: A Story of Corruption, Impunity and Cover-up’ (2007) 31 Journal of Regulatory Economics 
209. 
24 See e.g. Iain Paterson, Marcel Fink and Anthony Ogus, Economic Impact of Regulation in the Field of Liberal 
Professions in Different Member States (Study for the European Commission, DG Competition) (2003) 18-21; 
Gillian Hadfield, ‘Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control Over 
Corporate Legal Markets,’ (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1689. 
25 See section 1.2, below, for an account of the public interest theory of legal services regulation. 
26 Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini, ‘Barriers to Entry and the Self-Regulating Profession: Evidence from 
the Market for Italian Accountants’ in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini (eds), Organized Interests and 
Self -Regulation : An Economic Approach (Oxford University Press 1999) 132-3; Richard Moorhead, Avrom Sherr 
and Alan Paterson, ‘Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales’ (2003)  37 Law 
& Society Review 765; Morris M. Kleiner and Hwikwon Ham, Regulating Occupations: Does Occupational 
Licensing Increase Earnings and Reduce Employment Growth? (2005) 2-3. 
27 Mario Pagliero, ‘What is the Objective of Professional Licensing? Evidence from the US Market for Lawyers’ 
(2011) 29 International Journal of Industrial Organization 473; Robert D. Tollison, ‘Rent Seeking: A Survey’ 
(1982) 35 Kyklos International Review for Social Sciences 575, 578. 
28 Deborah Rhode, ‘Reforming American Legal Practice and Legal Education: Rethinking the Role of Nonlawyers 
in Delivering and Financing Legal Services,’ (2014) Legal Ethics [forthcoming].   
29 Geoffrey Hazard, Russell Pearce and Jeffrey Stempel, ‘Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise:  A Market 
Analysis of Legal Services,’ (1983) 58 New York University Law Review 1084. 
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Rents are most reliably guaranteed by cartels, which is how these critics perceive licensing regimes.30   
Occupational licensing, backed by the criminal prosecution of unauthorised practice, is understood as ‘use 
of the political process to improve the economic circumstances of a group’.31  If the licensing hurdles are 
set by self-regulatory groups, they will make them excessively onerous.32   As Milton Friedman pointed 
out in his analysis of the medical profession, lobbying for new licensing regimes and barriers almost 
invariably comes from occupational groups, and not from consumers. This, according to Friedman, is a 
telling indication that licenses serve the interests of the former group at the expense of the latter.33
licensure has reduced both the quantity and quality of medical practice… 
reduced the opportunities available to people who would like to be physicians, 
forcing them to pursue occupations they regard as less attractive; [and] forced 
the public to pay more for less satisfactory medical service.
  Far 
from safeguarding the public, Friedman argued,  
34
Alex Maurizi found empirical support for the proposition that self-regulatory professions manipulate the 
pass rates on licensing exams to preserve professional incomes as demand fluctuates; 
 
35 Mario Pagliero 
added similar evidence specific to American lawyers.36  When standards are raised, existing practitioners 
are often ‘grandfathered’ while new entrants must meet the higher standard.37 According to the capture 
critique, grandfathering is a safe way for the members of the occupation to restrict supply and enhance 
their collective reputation without putting themselves to the inconvenience of meeting the higher 
standards.38
1.1.2 Sociological Private Interest Theory 
  
The critical sociology of the professions has also analysed their development and interaction using the 
premise of self-interest. This sociological version of the private interest theory (also known as the ‘market 
control’ approach) is often traced to early-20th century German sociologist Max Weber.39                                                        
30 Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, Rent-Seeking And Innovation (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Research Department Staff Report 347) (2004); Deborah L. Rhode, ‘Policing the Professional Monopoly: A 
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions’ (1981) 34 Stanford Law Review 1 
(noting that the legal profession’s “conduct in restricting entry and negotiating agreements with competing groups is 
that of a trade association or cartel, rather than that of a monopolist.”). 
  Weber 
31 See Stigler (n 17) 13. 
32 Avner Shaked and John Sutton, ‘The Self-Regulating Profession’ (1981) 47 Review of Economic Studies 217,  225.    
See also Hayne E. Leland, ‘Quacks, Lemons and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards’ (1979) 87 
Journal of Political Economy 1328, 1337-9. 
33 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press [1962] 2002) 140. 
34 Ibid, 158. 
35 Alex Maurizi, ‘Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest’ (1974) 82 Journal of Political Economy 399. 
36 See Pagliero (n 27). 
37 James E. Moliterno, The American Legal Profession in Crisis: Resistance and Responses to Change (Oxford 
2013) 100 and 106-7. 
38 Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation : Legal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon Press 1994) 220; Manitoba Law 
Reform Commission, Regulating Professions and Occupations (Manitoba Law Commission 1994). 
39 See e.g., Abel (n 9). 
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observed the recurring tendency of economic competitors to form interest groups among themselves. 
These eventually evolve into a ‘legal order that limits competition through formal monopolies’.40  After a 
period of quiescence this approach was enthusiastically revived around 1970, and flourished for the next 
25 years. The assumption of professional self-interest and the focus on social power are leitmotifs running 
through the leading texts of the sociological version of capture.41
One of the distinct contributions of the sociological tradition, which is not present in the economists' 
version, is the dual nature of professional self-interest.  It has a pecuniary aspect (professionals' desire for 
market-control or market-shelter to enrich themselves),
   
42 but it also manifests itself in their desire to set 
themselves above and apart from other workers and service providers.43   Self-regulation helps them 
accomplish the latter goal by excluding arriviste competitors, and using discipline to expel those who 
lower the tone of the ‘club’ after somehow sneaking in.44 Professional discipline regimes are a favourite 
target for critics in this tradition. Typically it is argued that professional discipline will either be lax, or 
else will protect the interest of the profession and its elites rather than those of the public.45
Lawyers are often identified (along with doctors) as archetypal professionals.
 
46   It is therefore 
unsurprising that both the economic and the sociological versions of the capture critique have been 
applied explicitly to lawyers.  Richard Abel and Deborah Rhode are perhaps the common law world's best 
known and most prolific authors in this tradition. Regulation, according to Abel, has typically been used 
by Anglo-American lawyers to dampen competition,47 build legitimating myths48                                                        
40 Max Weber, Economy and Society : An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich; translators: Ephraim Fischoff et al. (Bedminster Press [1922] 1968) 342 -344. 
 and avert surveillance 
41 Terence Johnson, Professions and Power (Macmillan 1972); Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism : 
A Sociological Analysis (University of California Press 1977); Andrew Delano Abbott, The System of Professions : 
An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (University of Chicago Press 1988); Anne Witz, Professions and 
Patriarchy (Routledge 1992). 
42 Stefan Timmermans, ‘Professions and Their Work: Do Market Shelters Protect Professional Interests?’ (2008) 35 
Work and Occupations 164, 165. 
43 Eliot Freidson, Professionalism : The Third Logic (Polity Press 2001) 199; see also Larson (n 41): ‘I see 
professionalization as the process by which producers of special services sought to constitute and control a market 
for their expertise. Because marketable expertise is a crucial element in the structure of modern inequality, 
professionalization appears also as a collective assertion of special social status and as a collective process of 
upward social mobility’.  Regarding the definition of ‘service providers’ and regulatory treatment of lawyers as 
service providers, see Laurel S. Terry, ‘The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the 
Legal Profession as “Service Providers,”’ (2008) 2008 ABA Journal of the  Professional Lawyer 189.  
44 Robert P. Kaye, ‘Regulated (Self-)Regulation: A New Paradigm for Controlling the Professions?’ (2006) 21 
Public Policy and Administration 105. 
45 E.g., regarding lawyers, see Harry Arthurs, ‘The Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital 
Signs?’ (1995) 33 Alberta Law Review 800, 805; Duncan Webb, ‘Are Lawyers Regulatable?’ (2008) 5 Alberta Law 
Review 233, 247; Alice Woolley, ‘Regulation in Practice’ (2012) 15 Legal Ethics 243; Deborah L. Rhode, 
‘Professional Regulation and Public Service: An Unfinished Agenda’ in Scott L. Cummings (ed), The Paradox of 
Professionalism : Lawyers and the Possibility of Justice (Cambridge University Press 2011) 161. 
46 E.g. Gunter Burkart, ‘Professions and Professionalization’ in Austin Harrington, Barbara L. Marshall and Hans-
Peter Müller (eds), Encyclopedia of Social Theory (Routledge 2006). 
47 Richard Abel, ‘England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and Solicitors’ in 
Richard L. Abel and Philip Lewis (eds), Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World (University of California 
Press 1988) 43-4; See Abel (n 30) 142. 
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by outsiders.49   Rhode has argued that lawyers' fear of third-party lawsuits has impeded the adoption of 
broader ethical standards,50 and pointed to various regulatory policy issues in which the Bar's interest is 
so directly affected that self-regulators should never be expected to make disinterested decisions.51    
Benjamin Barton and Gillian Hadfield are other influential scholars who have applied capture theory to 
American legal services regulation.  Barton contends that judges, as lawyers, consistently favour lawyers' 
interests in regulating them,52 while Hadfield argues that the American legal profession’s monopoly 
distorts access to justice.53
The private interest theory has been applied to legal services regulatory regimes around the common law 
world.
 
54  Julian Webb has analysed the ramifications of evolving economic and governance phenomena 
for the legal profession using this standpoint.55 Frank Stephen's empirical research offers evidence for 
self-interest and capture among UK legal services regulators prior to the Legal Services Act, 2007. 56  
Constance Backhouse has shown how Canadian lawyers used professionalism rhetoric and legal ethics 
rules to ‘exercise power and exclusion based on gender, race, class and religion.’57                                                                                                                                                                                  
48 Richard L. Abel, ‘Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?’ (1981) 59 Texas  Law Review 639, 667 et seq. 
  Other legal scholars 
49 Abel, ‘England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and Solicitors’in Lawyers in 
society: The Common Law World (n 47) 24.  See also Richard L. Abel, English Lawyers Between Market and State: 
The Politics of Professionalism (Oxford University Press 2003); Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Dock: Learning 
from Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings (Oxford University Press 2008). 
50 Deborah L. Rhode, ‘Moral Counseling’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1317, 1333; Deborah L. Rhode, 
‘Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice 
Prohibitions’ (1981) 34 Stanford Law Review 1, 6. 
51 Deborah L. Rhode, ‘Professionalism In Perspective: Alternative Approaches To Nonlawyer Practice’ (1996) 22 
New York University Review of  Law & Social Change 701, 706; Deborah L. Rhode, Access to justice (Oxford 
University Press 2004); ibid Deborah L. Rhode and Alice Woolley, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer 
Regulation: An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada’ (2012) 80 Fordham Law Review 2761.  In a 
similar vein, see Sung Hui Kim, ‘Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping’ (2011) 63 
Florida Law Review 129, 144. 
52 Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American legal system (Cambridge University Press 
2011)[Barton, Lawyer-Judge Bias] 23, 132.  See also Benjamin Hoorn Barton, ‘Why Do We Regulate Lawyers: An 
Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation’ (2001) 33 Arizona State Law Journal 
429. 
53 Gillian Hadfield, ‘The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System,’ (2000) 98 
Michigan Law Review 953. 
54 Its influence can be seen in works such as Christine Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice 
(Oxford University Press 1999) and Avrom Sherr, ‘The ‘Control’ Orthodoxy in England and Wales – A 
Retrospective Review’ (2009) 16 International Journal of the Legal Profession 153. 
55 Julian Webb, ‘The Dynamics of Professionalism: The Moral Economy of English Legal Practice - and Some 
Lessons for New Zealand’ (2008) 16 Waikato Law Review 21; Julian Webb, ‘Regulating Lawyers in a Liberalized 
Legal Services Market: The Role of Education and Training’ (2013) 24 Stanford Law & Policy Review 533. 
56 Frank H. Stephen, Report of Further Research on the Law Society of Scotland Guarantee Fund. (Manchester and 
Edinburgh: Economy and Global Governance Institute for Law & Scottish Legal Complaints Commission, 2011).  
See Chapter 4 of Stephen, Lawyers, Markets and Regulation (n 8) entitled ‘Lawyers and Incentives’. 
57 Constance Backhouse, ‘Gender and Race in the Construction of “Legal Professionalism”: Historical Perspectives 
(Paper presented at the First Colloquium on the Legal Profession)’. 
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who have drawn on private interest and market control analysis include Wesley Pue and James 
Moliterno.58
1.2 Public Interest Theories 
 
The two public interest theories of legal services regulation—market failure and legal-ethical—begin with 
the premise that the purpose of regulation is to protect clients, third parties and interests other than those 
of legal services providers.   Throughout the industrialised world, regulators rely on these related, but 
conceptually distinct, rationales to justify their work.  
The market failure version perceives legal services as instances of information asymmetries and 
externality problems, which occur in various markets.  The legal-ethical version is found in lawyer credos 
and legal scholarship, as well as in the work of structural-functionalist sociologists.  The legal-ethical 
approach, in turn, relies on arguments that self-regulation is necessary to protect clients and society. A 
major distinction between the legal-ethical and market failure approaches is that the legal-ethical version 
treats purchasers of legal services as clients of legal services providers, while the market failure version 
treats them as consumers, with the consumers' typical interests in price, quality, and choice. 
1.2.1 Market Failure Public Interest Theory 
Market failure has been defined as ‘a situation where the free play of market forces cannot be relied upon 
to maximise economic welfare’.59  It is an exception to the doctrines of free markets and caveat emptor, 
which are today the general policy premises of wealthy common law countries.60
Information asymmetry is a commonly cited market failure justifying regulation.
  The market failure 
version of the public interest theory holds that regulation is imposed upon legal services to correct or 
mitigate these failures.   
61  The information 
problem is that consumers are often unable to ‘judge the value of the services offered on the market in 
terms of their own needs and priorities.’62  The asymmetry lies in the fact that the provider of expert 
services often has a much better grasp of the relevant information than does the prospective consumer.63                                                        
58 W. Wesley Pue and University of Manitoba. Canadian Legal History Project., Lawyers and the Constitution of 
Political Society : Containing Radicalism and Maintaining Order in Prairie Canada, 1900-1930 (Faculty of Law, 
University of Manitoba 1993) W. Wesley Pue, ‘Becoming “Ethical”: Lawyers’ Professional Ethics in Early 
Twentieth Century Canada’ (1991) 20 Manitoba Law Journal 237; Moliterno (n 
   
37) Chapter 2.   
59 Frank H. Stephen, ‘Regulation of the Legal Professions or Regulation of Markets for Legal Services: Potential 
Implications of the Legal Services Act 2007’ (2008) 19 European Business Law Review 1130, 1131. 
60 Michael J. Trebilcock, Carolyn J. Tuohy and Alan D. Wolfson, Professional Regulation : A Staff Study of 
Accountancy, Architecture, Engineering and Law in Ontario prepared for the Professional Organization Committee 
(Ministry of the Attorney General 1979) 45-46; Alice Woolley, ‘Why do we Regulate Lawyers?’ in David L. Blaikie, 
Thomas Cromwell and Darrel Pink (eds), Why Good Lawyers Matter (Irwin Law Inc. 2012) 110.  
61 Morris M. Kleiner, Licensing Occupations : Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? (W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research 2006) 44; Ran Spiegler, ‘The Market for Quacks’ (2006) 73 The Review of Economic 
Studies 1113; Alice Woolley, ‘Imperfect Duty: Lawyers' Obligation to Foster Access to Justice’ (2008) 45 Alberta 
Law Review 107, 121; Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing’ (2004) 69 
Missouri Law Review 299, 304-306;  see Stephen, Lawyers, Markets and Regulation (n 8) 13. 
62 Trebilcock, Tuohy and Wolfson (n 60) 51. 
63 Some scholars describe these problems in terms of agency costs instead of information asymmetry, e.g. Barton, 
‘Why Do We Regulate Lawyers: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation’ (n 
52) 467; William Bishop, ‘Regulating the Market for Legal Services in England: Enforced Separation of Function 
and Restrictions on Forms of Enterprise’ (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 326, 328. 
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Information asymmetry is a consequence of the experience and credence qualities of expert services.64  
Not only do consumers have difficulty ascertaining their needs for legal services and the quality of the 
available alternatives before purchasing them (the experience quality),65 but they also have difficulty in 
evaluating them before and after the purchase (the credence quality).66 The asymmetry is compounded by 
the fact that most individual consumer-clients utilise expert services infrequently, and therefore have little 
opportunity to learn from experience.67 The failures afflicting markets for professional services were 
clearly identified by Kenneth Arrow's 1963 article about medical care, and subsequent scholarship has 
argued that they are equally applicable in the case of legal services.68
Specific problems resulting from information asymmetry include supplier-induced demand,
 
69 and a 
downward spiral of declining quality attributable to adverse selection.70
The second branch of the market failure public interest theory is that regulation prevents negative 
externalities resulting from bad legal service provision.
 Legal services regulation can 
prevent or mitigate all of these problems.  This approach asserts that effective licensure will ensure all 
providers meet a minimum quality standard.  Meanwhile conduct rules forbid exploitation of vulnerable 
clients or inflation of demand. 
71   An externality (also known as a third party 
effect) occurs when the costs and benefits of a transaction are not borne exclusively by the parties thereto.  
Externalities create the potential for under-production, over-production, and self-dealing by consumers 
and producers at the expense of third parties.72
                                                        
64 Francisco Cabrillo and Sean Fitzpatrick, The Economics of Courts and Litigation (Edward Elgar 2008);  Larry E. 
Ribstein, ‘Ethical Rules Agency Costs and Law Firm Structure’ (1998) 84 Virginia Law Review 1707, 1712-13; 
Gillian Hadfield, ‘The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System’ (2000) 98 Michigan 
Law Review 953, 968 (noting that legal services are credence goods and describing the informational disparities 
between lawyers and consumers).    
    
65 Wilkins (n 10) 824. 
66 Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni, ‘Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud’ (1973) 16 Journal of Law 
and Economics 67, 68-9; Paul Fenn and Alistair McGuire, ‘The Assessment: The Economics of Legal Reform’ 
(1994) 10 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 1, 5; and Ogus, Regulation : Legal Form and Economic Theory (n 29) 
216; Woolley, ‘Imperfect Duty: Lawyers' Obligation to Foster Access to Justice’ (n 61) 122. 
67 Edward Shinnick, Fred Bruinsma and Christine Parker, ‘Aspects of Regulatory Reform in the Legal Profession: 
Australia, Ireland and the Netherlands’ (2003) 10 International Journal of the Legal Profession 237, 237. 
68 Kenneth J. Arrow, 'Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care' (1963) 53 The American Economic 
Review 941. 
69 Carolyn Cox and Susan Foster, The Costs And Benefits Of Occupational Regulation (1990) 11-12; Frank H. 
Stephen and James H. Love, ‘5860: Regulation of the Legal Profession’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De 
Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (1999) 989 <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5860book.pdf > 
accessed 3 January 2014; Ribstein, ‘Ethical Rules Agency Costs and Law Firm Structure’ (n 64) 1711; Roger Van 
den Bergh and Yves  Montangie, ‘Competition in Professional Services Markets: Are Latin Notaries Different?’ 
(2006) 2 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 189, 193-4. 
70 See Leland (n 32); Paterson, Fink and Ogus (n 24) 17; Shinnick, Bruinsma and Parker (n 67); Spiegler (n 61). 
71 E.g. Cox and Foster (n 69) 9-10. 
72 Randal N. Graham, Legal Ethics : Theories, Cases, and Professional Regulation (2nd ed., Emond Montgomery 
Publications 2011). 
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A negative externality occurs when a deficiency in the service causes harm to a third party.  The third 
party might be a secondary victim of the deficiency, along with the innocent consumer.73  However, a 
consumer who suffers from no information asymmetry, and requires no regulatory protection from her 
own service provider, might choose to purchase services that cause grave harms to others.  Preventing 
these outcomes through licensing and conduct rules is the second public interest rationale given for legal 
services regulation.74
In legal services, while protecting consumer-clients is the dominant regulatory rationale, negative 
externalities are also mentioned as a reason to regulate.  The classic example is the slapdash will. An 
inexpensive but poorly prepared will that is ambiguous or incoherent might be perfectly acceptable to a 
fully informed client.  The testator might visit a drafting solicitor’s office only because she wishes to see 
that a certain bequest is made. She might care little about the residue of the estate, given that she will not 
be around to see what happens to it.  However, the resulting slapdash will can subject the beneficiaries to 
many painful and expensive years of personal strife and litigation.
 
75
The third branch of the market failure public interest theory maintains that regulation encourages positive 
externalities from legal services provision.
 
76  Just like bad legal services, good legal services can spread 
their effects beyond the consumer.  Regulation is justified, on this view, because unconstrained market 
actors will only transact for the quantity and quality of services that maximises their own welfare.77  The 
unregulated free market would therefore ‘under-produce’ good legal services.  Regulation might in 
principle be used to encourage purchase of legal services when these positive externalities justify it but 
the consumer would not otherwise do so.78
What are the positive externalities of good legal services?  High quality litigated solutions to 
controversies create precedents and legal certainty from which others benefit.
 
79
                                                        
73 Manitoba Law Reform Commission (n 
 Hiring a good legal 
service provider as opposed to conducting litigation as an unrepresented litigant also has positive 
38) 14. 
74 K. B. Leffler, ‘Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American Medicine’ (1978) 21 Journal of Law 
and Economics 165, 174. 
75 A defective transfer of real estate can have similar impacts on subsequent purchasers: Van den Bergh and 
Montangie (n 69) 196. 
76 Woolley, ‘Imperfect Duty: Lawyers' Obligation to Foster Access to Justice’ (n 61). 
77 Trebilcock, Tuohy and Wolfson (n 60) 60-1. 
78 Van den Bergh and Montangie (n 69) 191; Christopher Decker and George Yarrow, Understanding the Economic 
Rationale for Legal Services Regulation: A Report for the Legal Services Board (2010). 
79 David Luban, ‘Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm’ (1995) 83 Georgetown Law Journal 2619; Van 
den Bergh and Montangie; Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, CCBE Economic Submission To 
Commission Progress Report On Competition In Professional Services (2006); Council of Bars and Law Societies 
of Europe, CCBE Economic Submission To Commission Progress Report On Competition In Professional Services 
(2006); Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, CCBE Economic Submission To Commission Progress Report 
On Competition In Professional Services (2006) 
<http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/ccbe_economic_submis1_1182239202.pdf> 5 accessed 
3 January 2014.  William Bishop argued that regulation giving UK barristers a monopoly on certain forms of court 
advocacy helped preserve this positive externality, insofar as it increased the quality of legal argument. (Bishop (n  
63) 333.) 
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externalities.80 Regulation can also encourage—or even mandate—pro bono service that benefits the 
public by increasing access to justice at the same time that it benefits indigent individuals.81
1.2.2 Legal-Ethical Public Interest Theory 
 
Bar leaders,82 legal scholars,83 and structural-functionalist sociologists84
The argument from status to function begins with the business-profession dichotomy described by bar 
leaders, legal scholars, and structural-functionalist sociologists. Unlike business people, lawyers have 
both inaccessible expertise and commitment to the public good, which both requires, and justifies societal 
reliance upon, the legal profession to regulate itself.
 have offered a very different 
public interest rationale for legal services regulation.  Rather than view legal services through the lens of 
the market, these commentators argue that the function of legal services providers is exceptional.  Based 
on the unique characteristics, they assert that licensed legal services providers – lawyers – should as a 
general matter regulate legal services independent of interference from the market or the State.  They 
claim that the legal profession’s independence is necessary for lawyers to protect clients, the rule of law, 
and the public good.  They differ slightly in their method of argument.  Some derive lawyers’ function 
from their status while others derive their status from their function. 
85
As a result, society enters into a bargain with the profession where society agrees to self-regulation that 
offers autonomy from regulation by the market and the state.  In the words of one commentator, 
  
Perceiving a social need, and the profession's competence to handle it, the society negotiates a 
deal with the profession: the society will confer the benefits and privileges of a legal monopoly 
upon the group in return for a promise of public service,  i.e., a promise to carry on professional 
practice in accordance with high standards of performance, for the public good.86                                                          
80  Having a lawyer makes litigation easier and less costly for one’s adversaries and for the court system. See e.g. 
Rachel Birnbaum and Nicholas Bala, ‘Views of Ontario Lawyers on Family Litigants without Representation’ 
(2012) 63 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 99; PricewaterhouseCoopers, Economic Value of Legal Aid: 
Analysis in Relation to Commonwealth Funded Matters with a Focus on Family Law (2009).   
81 But see Russell G. Pearce, ‘How Law Firms Can Do Good While Doing Well (And The Answer Is Not Pro Bono)’ 
(2005) 33 Fordham Urban Law Journal 211. 
82 American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint 
for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (Report for the ABA Commission on Professionalism 1986)  
83 E.g., Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times: With Reference to the Development of Bar 
Associations in the United States’ (West Publishing Co., 1953) 5, Robert W. Gordon, 'The Independence of 
Lawyers' (1988) 68 Boston University Law Review 1. 
 
84 Abel, American Lawyers at 12, 16, 35-37 (discussing Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons). 
85 E.g., ABA Commission on Professionalism at 18; Russell G. Pearce, ‘The Professional Paradigm Shift: Why 
Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar’ (1995) 70 New York 
University Law Review 1229, 1238-40 [hereinafter, ‘Paradigm Shift’].   
86 Lisa H. Newton, ‘Professionalization: The Intractable Plurality of Values’ in Wade L. Robisen et al. (eds), Profits 
and Professions: Essays in Business and Professional Ethics (Humana Press 1983).  See also Nancy J. Moore, 
‘Professionalism Reconsidered’, (1987) American Bar Foundation Research Journal 773,784; Paradigm Shift at 
1238 n. 38; Robert W. Gordon, ‘The Independence of Lawyers’, (1988) 68 Boston University Law Review 1, 6-7; 
Rayman L. Solomon, ‘Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism 1925-1960’ in Robert L Nelson et  
al. (eds.), Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession (Cornell 
University Press 1992) 146-47. 
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Complementing the argument from status to function is the argument from function to status that focuses 
on the role of lawyers in a liberal democracy.  The independence of lawyers is necessary to protect 
individual rights, rule of law, and the public good.  Independence both prevents ‘any source of authority, 
public or private, [from limiting] clients’ access to the public goods encoded in the law’87 and encourages 
compliance with law by preserving lawyers’ discretion to serve ‘as a mediating force between the 
interests of private clients and the public purposes of the legal order.’88 According to some, the 
independence of lawyers is also essential to protect judicial independence.89
 
  
The legal-ethical public interest theories are both similar to, and different from, the market failure public 
interest theory.  Both approaches acknowledge information asymmetry, as well as negative and positive 
externalities.  They differ in that the legal-ethical approaches view the delivery of legal services as 
essentialist.  Many legal ethicists ascribe special interests to lawyers' clients, including a client’s interest 
in loyal and devoted service from a trusted professional. These interests are unique, legitimate and not 
shared by most other consumers. Charles Fried’s conception of the lawyer as a ‘special-purpose friend’ 
who, within the scope of his retainer, ‘adopts your interests as his own’ reflects this view.90
 
 No one would 
dream of demanding this from a microwave oven or a futures contract, and reducing client interest to any 
permutation of price, quality or choice does not sufficiently contemplate the nuanced and significant 
nature of legal advice.   
Similarly essentialist is the description of lawyers’ public role.  The ABA's Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct suggests in the preamble that regulation guides lawyers to contribute to public welfare as 
‘officer[s] of the legal system’ who ‘play a vital role in the preservation of society.’91  This notion has a 
long history in the United States, including Tocqueville’s often quoted description of lawyers as the 
aristocracy of the United States,92 Louis Brandeis’s exhortation that the legal profession promote the 
public good,93 and Roscoe Pound’s description of law practice as the ‘[p]ursuit of the learned art in the 
spirit of a public service.’94 Structural-functionalist sociologists, such as Emile Durkheim and Talcott 
Parsons, offer a corresponding understanding that lawyers serve a necessary and beneficial role as 
intermediaries between the people and the law.95
                                                        
87 Wilkins, supra note , at 859.  See also, e.g., Bruce A. Green, ‘Lawyers’ Professional Independence:  Overrated or 
Undervalued?’ (2013) 46 Akron Law Review 599, 604, 613-19.  
 Another version of this understanding is Brad Wendell 
and Alice Woolley’s view that the lawyer’s public role involves counselling, dispute resolution and 
88 Wilkins (n 10) 859-60.  See also, e.g., Green (n 87) 608-12. 
89 Wilkins (n 10) 853-58.  See also, e.g., Green (n 87) 607. 
90 Charles Fried, ‘The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation’ (1976) 85 Yale Law 
Journal 1060, 1071.  However subsequent work in legal ethics has called for attention to the consequences of 
lawyering on third parties and broader interests, e.g. Debra Lyn Bassett, ‘Redefining the Public Profession’ (2005) 
36 Rutgers Law Journal 721 and Richard K. Greenstein, ‘Against Professionalism’ (2009) 22 Georgetown Journal 
of Legal Ethics 327. 
91 American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2010) Preamble paras 1 and 5. 
92 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Adlard and Saunders, [1831] 1862) 
93 Pound (n 82) 5. 
94 Pound (n 82) 5.  
95 Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Brookfield Ctr, Routledge [1890] 1992) 
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preventing miscarriages of justice. If it is abandoned or performed negligently, the ‘pluralist compromise 
of democracy’ itself is put at risk.96
 
  
As a result of this essentialist view, legal-ethical theories propose that lawyers have the exclusive capacity 
to understand lawyers’ duties to their clients, the court, third parties, and the public and to promulgate 
regulations to promote and police those duties.  Lawyers do so through a scheme of self-regulation that 
governs the licensing and discipline of legal services providers, as well as through regulations that focus 
on protecting clients such as through rules regarding confidentiality and conflicts; protecting the 
administration of justice such as through rules prohibiting client perjury; and promoting the public good 
such as through rules encouraging pro bono and compliance with law.97
 
   
Within legal-ethical theories, the concept of self-regulation is a relatively broad one.  Proponents of legal-
ethical public interest theory do not necessarily require that organisations of lawyers regulate lawyers.  
Rather, many commentators describe regulation by judges who are lawyers as self-regulation, presumably 
because those judges work closely with the organised bar to develop rules governing lawyers and 
ultimately those judges adopt and enforce the rules.98
 The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted 
 powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close 
 relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This 
 connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested 
 largely in the courts.
  As the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct explain: 
99
Where Part I offers a review of models for explaining the basis for regulating the delivery of legal 
services, Part II suggests a taxonomy of modes of regulatory strategies.   
 
PART II:  HOW SHOULD LEGAL SERVICES BE REGULATED? 
 
Although sociological private interest theory provides only a critique, economic private interest, 
economic public interest, and legal-ethical public interest accounts prescribe regulatory modes.  Because 
no jurisdiction has applied economic private interest theory to legal services, we focus here upon the 
economic and legal-ethical public interest accounts.  To describe economic public interest modes of 
regulation, we use the term consumerist-competitive to underscore its emphasis on protecting consumers 
and promoting competition.  To describe legal-ethical public interest modes of regulation, we use the term 
professionalist-independent to emphasise its commitment to the essentialist approach to legal services 
associated with professionalism and self-regulation.  Professionalist-independent regimes are predominant 
in common law North America, while consumerist-competitive modes have increasingly come to the fore 
in England/Wales and Australia, as well as Ireland and New Zealand.   
For purposes of our taxonomy, the dominant approaches of economic and legal-ethical public interest 
theories both define principles and suggest regulatory regimes.  But examination of how regulation of                                                         
96 Ibid. 108. W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton University Press  [2010] 2012). 
97 See, e.g., ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
98 See Green (n 87) 605-06.  But see Fred C. Zacharias, ‘The Myth of Self-Regulation’ (2009) 93 Minnesota Law 
Review 1147, 1189.  
99 See Model Rules (n 92) Preamble Para 10. 
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legal services functions in practice leads to further refinement of our taxonomy.  While particular modes 
may be dominant in specific jurisdictions, all common law jurisdictions employ both professionalist-
independent and consumerist-competitive strategies, as well as hybrid modes that combine elements of 
both.  In addition, the professionalist-independent mode has produced an unintended consequence – the 
development of a robust sphere of legal services that is largely unregulated.  
2.1. The Professionalist-independent Mode of Common Law North America 
In the United States and in common law Canada, the dominant approach to legal services regulation still 
hews closely to a blueprint drafted in the late nineteenth century.  With a few exceptions, these 
jurisdictions all maintain a unified, hegemonic occupation of ‘lawyer’ and uphold so-called ‘self-
regulatory’ governance, whereby lawyers and lawyer-judges draft, adopt, and enforce the profession’s 
rules for admission to practice law and to maintain one’s law license.  They are also distinctive in their 
regulatory efforts to insulate lawyers from non-lawyer influence through strictures on alternative business 
structures, external investment, and multi-disciplinary practice. They similarly promote lawyer 
independence from clients as a way to promote the pubic good.  Finally, professionalist-independent 
regimes focus regulation on individual lawyers, as opposed to the firms in which they work. 
2.1.1 Professionalism and Autonomy as Core Values 
Professionalism and independence are the two conceptually connected but rhetorically distinct ‘core 
values’ which animate legal services regulation in common law North America.100  As noted in Part I, the 
professionalism approach to legal-ethical public interest theory assumes the essentialist character of 
lawyers and the lawyer-client relationship.  Lawyers differ from providers of other services in that they 
both have an understanding of how to protect clients and the public that is inaccessible to non-lawyers 
and a unique capacity as individuals and a self-regulating collective to provide those services with fidelity 
to clients, courts, and the public good.101
The second core value is independence, both of lawyers and of the legal profession.  Although derived 
from the conditions that professionalism describes, the goal of independence is often deployed separately.  
It too references the assumption of legal-ethical theory that independence is necessary for lawyers to 
represent clients zealously, as well as to promote rule of law and liberal democracy.   Both individual 
lawyers and lawyers as a group require independence to achieve these goals.
  
102
Noel Semple, for example, argues that each of the four distinctive characteristics of anglo-North 
American legal services regulatory regimes—the unified legal occupation, self-regulation, insulation of 
legal services providers, and the focus on individual providers—can be traced to one or both of the 
professionalism and independence values.
 
103  Despite arguments that its influence is waning,104 the 
resilience of the professionalist-independent mode was demonstrated by the rejection of market-oriented 
reforms by ABA’s Commission on Ethics 20/20.105
                                                        
100 Renee Newman Knake, ‘Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services’ (2012) 73 Ohio State Law Journal 1, 5. 
  
101 See discussion supra Part I. 
102 See discussion supra Part I. 
103 Noel Semple, Core Values: Professionalism and Independence Theories in Lawyer Regulation (2013). For 
example, the core conception of each lawyer as an independent and autonomous moral agent underlies the resistance 
to firm-level regulation. 
104 Pearce (n 81); Maute (n 110); Terry, ‘The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession" (n 35). 
105 Moliterno (n 37), chapters 8 & 9. 
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2.1.2 Primacy of Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation, the first defining feature of professionalist-independent regimes, is a form of governance 
characterised by the right of the regulatees to promulgate and enforce their own regulations. 
The self-regulatory character of legal services regulation is clear in common law Canada.  Legal services 
regulation is dominated by law societies.  The law societies are led by boards of directors, the members of 
which are known as ‘benchers’.106   In each law society, at least eighty per cent of the benchers are 
licensees.107
In the United States, while legislatures do engage in some limited forms of legal services regulation, the 
dominant roles are played by the state courts as well as state bar and licensing authorities and the ABA.  
For purposes of professionalist-independent proponents, the state bar and licensing authorities and the 
ABA are considered self-regulatory insofar as they are led by and accountable to lawyers (or lawyer-
judges).
 
108  The judiciary, which has a central role in American legal services regulation,109 is of course a 
branch of government.   Some commentators therefore argue that the regime is better understood as one 
of state regulation or co-regulation rather than self-regulation.110
For purposes of our taxonomy, we need not resolve this dispute.  Rather, we seek to describe the 
professionalist-independent principles and practices as described by their proponents.  In the United 
States today, advocates of a professionalist-independent approach do tend to define regulation by judges 
who are lawyers as self-regulation.   
  
2.1.3 The Subject Matter of Professionalist-Independent Regulation 
Both professionalism and independence require lawyers to promulgate rules for licensing, conduct, and 
discipline.  These rules, in turn, prescribe lawyers’ duties to clients, third-parties, courts, and the public.111  
Client protections include guarantees of competence, loyalty, and confidentiality.112
                                                        
106 Adam M. Dodek and others, Canadian Legal Practice : A Guide for the 21st Century (LexisNexis Canada 2009) 
s. 1.71.  In some of the Atlantic provinces, the term is ‘Council’ and in the northern territories of Canada, the term is 
‘Executive’. 
 Essential to these 
protections are rules that assure lawyer independence from third parties, including rules that police third 
party payments for legal services, prohibit non-lawyer ownership of law firms, and circumscribe conflicts 
107 In Ontario, where there is a paralegal licensure regime, 75% of the benchers (40 individuals) are lawyers and 9% 
are paralegals (5 individuals). 
108 See Barton, The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System. 
109 Eli Wald, ‘Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?’ (2010) 42 McGeorge Law Review 149, 161; Benjamin H. Barton, 
‘An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or 
the Market?’ 37 Georgia Law Review 1167, 1171; Fred C. Zacharias, ‘The Myth of Self-Regulation’ (2009) 93 
Minnesota Law Review 1147, 1174.  
110 Judith L. Maute, ‘Global Continental Shifts to a New Governance Paradigm in Lawyer Regulation and Consumer 
Protection : Riding the Wave’ in Reid Mortensen, Francesca Bartlett and Kieran Tranter (eds), Alternative 
Perspectives on Lawyers and Legal Ethics: Reimagining the Profession (Routledge 2010) 30; Laurel S Terry, Steve 
Mark and Tahlia Gordon, ‘Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession’ (2012) 80 Fordham Law 
Review 2661, 2670; Dana Ann Remus, ‘Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships’ (2011) 30 Yale Law & 
Policy Review 123,132; See  Zacharias (n 110); Ted Schneyer, ‘Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and 
Australian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice’ (2009) 2009 Journal of  the Professional 
Lawyer 13, 27. 
111 See ABA Model Rules (2013)   
112 See ABA Model Rules 1.1, 1.3. 1.6 (2013)   
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of interest.113   Fulfilling obligations to third-parties, courts, and the public also require independence 
from clients.  Rules generally require lawyers to avoid misleading third parties or assisting clients in 
violating the law.114 They promulgate a duty to the court that includes prohibitions on making frivolous 
arguments or facilitating client perjury115 and advance a public good function through the exercise of 
independent judgment in counselling clients and an aspiration to provide pro bono assistance to the 
poor.116
2.1.4 Exclusive Legal Occupation  
  We contrast the substantive rules of professionalist-independent regimes with those of 
consumerist-competitive regimes below at 2.2.3. 
An axiom of professionalist-independent regulation is that only licensed legal services providers can 
provide legal services.   Today, within each common law North American jurisdiction there is one group 
of people who are authorised to provide legal services independently and that group is known as ‘lawyers.’ 
Historically, professionalist-independent principles have not necessarily required a unified legal 
occupation.  In England/Wales, for example, professionalist-independent regulation included licenses for 
barristers, solicitors, and notaries.  In all professionalist-independent regimes, the delivery of legal 
services by those who do not obtain licenses from a self-regulated legal profession is forbidden as 
‘unauthorized practice of law’.117
2.1.5 Insulation of Legal Service Providers 
 
As explained above, professionalist-independent modes protect the independence of lawyers.  One 
method for doing so is to insulate legal service providers from the influence of non-licensees.  Various 
business structure rules are deployed to prevent individual providers from being economically beholden 
to anyone other than their clients or other lawyers in their firms.  While this does not foreclose all possible 
forms of collaboration between lawyers and non-lawyers, it does significantly restrict them.118
Non-lawyers are generally forbidden to own shares or assume directorship in incorporated law practices 
in anglo-North American jurisdictions.
 
119  Regulators also seek to insulate lawyers using rules prohibiting 
multi-disciplinary partnerships (MDPs).  An MDP is a ‘business arrangemen[t] in which individuals with 
different professional qualifications practise together’.120                                                        
113 See ABA Model Rules 1.7, 1.9, 1.11, 1.12, 5.4, 5.5 (2013)   
  North American jurisdictions either forbid such 
114 See ABA Model Rules 1.2, 4.1, 4.4 (2013)   
115 See ABA Model Rules 3.2, 3.3  (2013)  
116 See ABA Model Rules 1.2, 6.5 (2013)   
117 American Law Institute, Restatement, Third, The Law Governing Lawyers (American Law Institute 2000) 35: ‘A 
person not admitted to practice as a lawyer may not engage in the unauthorized practice of law’.  All states have 
statutes to this effect; Derek A. Denckla, ‘Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the 
Legal and Ethical Parameters’ (1999) 67 Fordham Law Review 2581,  2587. 
118 John S. Dzienkowski and Robert J. Peroni, 'Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A 
Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century' (2000) 69 Fordham 
Law Review 83. 
119 American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2010) (n 92), R. 5.4(d)(1); Gillian K. Hadfield, 
‘The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice through the Corporate Practice of Law’ (2013) ___ International 
Review of Law and Economics ___, 14 [forthcoming]. 
120 Canadian Bar Association International Practice of Law Committee, Striking a Balance: The Report of the 
International Practice of Law Committee on Multi-Disciplinary Practices and the Legal Profession (1999) at 11. 
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arrangements, or regulate them very tightly.121  Finally, professionalist-independent regulators have also 
created rules to prohibit contractual relationships between lawyers and others which would give any 
‘nonlawyer…the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer’. 122
2.1.6 Regulatory Focus on Individual Lawyers 
  As a consequence of 
these rules,  North American law firms historically have been exclusively financed and controlled by 
lawyers, and the consumer legal market has been served almost exclusively by small firms and solo 
practitioners.   
The professionalist-independent perspective favors, but does not require, regulation of individual lawyers, 
and not of law firms.  Its essentialist construction of lawyers and legal services assumes that most lawyers 
are trustworthy and promotes independence of lawyers, as well as of the legal profession.123  It assumes 
that most lawyers will follow the rules provided them.  The primary focus of discipline is the few lawyers 
who are not trustworthy.  Accordingly, with minor exceptions, American and Canadian legal services 
regulation applies to individual lawyers, and not to law firms.  American legal scholar Ted Schneyer 
recently concluded that, despite the scholarly efforts which Schneyer himself initiated,124 ‘the idea of 
disciplining firms has not caught on’ in the United States.125  This conclusion has been echoed by other 
observers of American legal services regulation.126  Adam Dodek’s comprehensive survey of Canadian 
legal services regulation reached a similar finding: ‘as a general matter, law societies regulate individual 
lawyers,’ and ‘there is little explicit regulatory focus on law firms’ in Canada although at least two 
provinces permit it, including British Columbia and Nova Scotia.127
2.2 The Consumerist-competitive Mode  
 
Beginning in the 1970s,128
                                                        
121 Paul D. Paton, ‘Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, And Reviving The MDP Debate 
In America’ (2010) 78 Fordham Law Review 2193; Richard Devlin and Albert Cheng, ‘Re-calibrating, Re-visioning 
and Re-thinking Self-Regulation in Canada’ (2010) 17 International Journal Of The Legal Profession 233 at 236 
 legal services regulators in England/Wales and Australia began to focus on 
two core values derived from economic public interest theory: competition and consumer rights.  These 
values have gradually displaced professionalism and lawyer independence as they are understood in the 
United States and Canada, manifesting themselves in regulatory regimes which today contrast sharply 
with those of anglophone North America.  More recently, the influence of the consumerist-competitive 
mode has become evident in legal services regulatory reforms taking place in Ireland and New Zealand.  
In Ireland, consumerist-competitive reform has been driven by both the national competition authority 
122 American Bar Association, R. 5.4(d)(3) (2013); Hadfield (n 119) 15. 
123 See discussion supra Part I. 
124 Ted Schneyer, ‘Professional Discipline for Law Firms’ (1991) 77 Cornell Law Review 1. See Russell G. Pearce 
and Eli Wald, ‘Rethinking Lawyer Regulation:  How a Relational Approach Would Improve Professional Rules and 
Roles’ (2012) 2012 Michigan State Law Review 513. 
125 Ted Schneyer, ‘A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the ‘Ethical Infrastructure’ of Law 
Firms’ (1998) 39 South Texas Law Review 245. 
126 E.g. Eli Wald, ‘Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of 
Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms’ (2010) 78 Fordham Law Review 2245, 2266, note 113. 
127 Adam Dodek, ‘Regulating Law Firms in Canada’ (2011) 90 Canadian Bar Review 383, 404 and 409. 
128 The United States Supreme Court also began to establish a consumer rights agenda during the late 1970s, for 
example overturning the blanket ban on lawyer advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 
(1977), yet state courts, state bar authorities and the ABA ultimately did not apply the Court’s reasoning in other 
areas of lawyer regulation. 
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and the similar inclinations of the "Troika" (International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, 
and the European Commission).129
The consumerist-competitive mode is characterised by (i) multiple and competing legal occupations, (ii) 
co-regulatory or external regulatory governance, (iii) tolerance of non-licensees influencing legal services 
providers and (iv) a dual regulatory focus on individual service providers and the enterprises in which 
they work. 
 
2.2.1 Competition and Consumer Rights as Core Values 
Consumerist-competitive approaches reject the essentialist view of legal services, including the business-
profession dichotomy.  They treat clients as being similarly situated to other consumers of goods and 
services, and lawyers as similar to other producers.  Accordingly, applying an economic public interest 
theory of regulation, they address market failure by promoting competition and protecting consumers.   
Competition between legal services providers is the first core value of these regimes. Many of the statutes 
in these jurisdictions now list ‘promoting competition’ among their regulatory objectives.130  Competition 
authorities outside of North America have taken a forceful approach to legal services regulation, 
providing a major driver of reform.131
Like competition, the second core value of consumerism treats clients as consumers, as opposed to 
essentialist clients.  The goal of regulations and of increased competition is to provide consumers with 
lower cost services of better quality, while regulating providers to address market failures, such as 
information asymmetry.
  Under economic public interest theory, competition will promote 
better quality services at lower prices.    
132  The predominant goal of consumerism is to make legal services cheaper, 
more satisfactory to consumers and more variegated.  Accordingly, while sharing the professionalist-
independent goal of loyal and devoted service, they reject the essentialist claim that lawyer-client 
relationship is somehow unique.133
The goal of promoting competition and consumer interests also addresses externalities.  Improving the 
quality of legal services reduces the harms to third parties from low quality services.
   
134 Reducing the 
price of legal services provides the positive externality of greater access to justice for low and middle 
income persons.135                                                        
129 Laurel S. Terry, ‘Transnational Legal Practice (International)’ (2013) 47 International Lawyer 485, 487-8. 
 
130 Legal Services Act 2007 (UK) s. 1(e); Legal Services Regulation Bill 2011 (Republic of Ireland) at main 
objectives section and at s. 9(4)(d); Legal Services (Scotland) Act 2010, s. 1(c). 
131 Director General of Fair Trading (UK), Competition in Professions (2001);  Commission Of The European 
Communities, Report on Competition in Professional Services (2004).  See also Christine Parker, ‘Regulation of the 
Ethics of Australian Legal Practice: Autonomy and Responsiveness’ (2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 676 and Laurel S. Terry, ‘The European Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional 
Services’ (2009) 29 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 1. 
132 E.g. Seneviratne (n 138) 313; Parker, ‘Regulation of the Ethics of Australian Legal Practice: Autonomy and 
Responsiveness’ (n 131) 690; Shinnick, Bruinsma and Parker (n 67) 246. 
133 See section 1.2.1, above. 
134 See Legal Services Board, ‘Regulatory Objectives’ 
(http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/publications/pdf/regulatory_objectives.pdf) 5-8.  See also 
n 71, above and accompanying text.  
135 See n 76, above and accompanying text. 
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Because consumerist-competitive regimes include active regulation to protect competition and consumers, 
consumerist-competitive reforms often result in ambitious and complicated regulation of legal service 
providers at the same time they employ the competition-oriented rhetoric of deregulation.136
2.2.2 Co-Regulation or External Regulation 
  
The consumerist-competitive mode rejects the professionalist-independent arguments for independence.  
Viewed in the context of consumers and producers more generally, self-regulation appears vulnerable to 
self-dealing and other forms of rent seeking.137 Accordingly, the preferred methods of regulation are 
external to legal services providers or co-regulation that includes both lay people and legal services 
providers.  The most common approach today is co-regulation agencies that include legal services 
providers but which are dominated by laypeople and accountable to the legislative or executive branches 
of government.138  In England and Wales, for example, the primary regulator is the Legal Services Board, 
which follows this co-regulatory model at the same that it continues to employ subservient self-regulatory 
bodies to carry out delegated functions.139
2.2.3 The Subject Matter of Consumerist-Competitive Regulation 
   
The goals of regulating the legal services consumer-provider relationship are similar to those for the 
lawyer-client relationship – competence, confidentiality, and loyalty.  They similarly forbid lawyers from 
assisting clients in crimes or fraud, otherwise misleading third parties or deceiving the courts. Where they 
differ is the with regard to goal of lawyer independence.  This distinction has three major effects.  First, it 
could lead to a different evaluation of categories of regulation that both modes share.  For example, in a 
competitive-consumerist regime, the purpose of conflict rules would be to require competent services and 
fulfilment of fiduciary obligations.  In a professionalist-independent regime, the prohibition of conflicts 
that did not interfere with the provision of services could be justified in order to promote independence.   
Second, and similarly, although both regimes reflect public interest theories of regulation, the 
consumerist-competitive approach would have more tools available to solve externality problems.  The 
professionalist-independent approach, for example, turns to a lawyer’s duty of pro bono to redress 
inequality in access to justice.  The consumerist-competitive approach could certainly require – or 
facilitate -- pro bono, but it could also seek through competition and regulation to address the problem 
through lower cost, reasonable quality services.  Similarly, where professionalist-independent regulators 
seek to promote lawyer independent judgment as a vehicle for promoting adherence to law, consumerist-
competitive regulators could take a similar approach and in addition or as an alternative seek to develop 
an ethical culture in a particular situation or organisation.  We discuss how this insight applies to lawyer 
regulation at 2.2.6 below.  Third, a consumerist-competitive paradigm is likely to reject rules grounded 
solely in the value of independence, such as restrictions on alternative business structures or 
multidisciplinary practices discussed at 2.2.5. below.  Of course, consumerist-competitive regulators 
could theoretically adopt such restrictions, but they would have to justify them on grounds of competence 
and integrity, and not independence.                                                         
136 Parker, ‘Regulation of the Ethics of Australian Legal Practice: Autonomy and Responsiveness’; Webb, 
‘Regulating Lawyers in a Liberalized Legal Services Market: The Role of Education and Training’ (n 55) 542. 
137 See notes 28 and 29, above, and accompanying text. 
138 Terry, Mark and Gordon (n 111) 2673. ‘Joint regulation’ is another phrase which has been used, e.g. by Mary 
Seneviratne, ‘Joint Regulation of Consumer Complaints in Legal Services: A Comparative Study’ (2001) 29 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 311, 311. 
139 David Clementi, Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England And Wales: Final Report 
(2004).  See also Andrew Boon, ‘Professionalism under the Legal Services Act 2007’ (2010) 17 International 
Journal of the Legal Profession 195. 
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2.2.4 Multiple, Competing Legal Occupations  
The value of competition favours a plurality of competing legal services providers. Consumerist-
competitive jurisdictions tend to have multiple licensing regimes, authorising different occupational 
groups to compete in different parts of the legal services marketplace.140  In England and Wales, 
regulation establishes eight legal occupations.141 Consumerist-competitive ideology also favours 
permitting non-licensed legal providers that are subject to consumer protection regulations.  These include 
the staff of Citizens Advice Bureaus in England/Wales and nonlawyer employees of for-profit businesses, 
such as banks, who could conceivably provide assistance to consumers in legal matters, as well as 
businesses that provide legal advice through software programs.142
2.2.5 Tolerance of Non-Licensee Influence within Firms 
 
Compared to professionalist-independent regimes, consumerist-competitive administrations allow 
significantly greater scope for non-licensees to become business partners, shareholders and managers of 
law firms.  In England and Wales, non-lawyers may own and manage incorporated law firms and form 
partnerships of equals with lawyers. The Legal Services Act 2007 uses the term ‘alternative business 
structure’ for any law firm in which non-lawyers are owners or managers.143  Australia’s business 
structure rules are at least as liberal as England/Wales.  Seven of the country’s eight states and the 
territories allow non-lawyers to own shares in, and manage, incorporated law firms.144 Multi-disciplinary 
partnerships have been permitted since 1990 and Australia is also home to the first publicly-traded law 
firm in the common law world.145
2.2.6 Firm-Based Regulation for Ethical Infrastructure 
  External investment and collaboration with non-lawyers has facilitated 
the emergence of consumer brands and large firms in the personal legal services marketplace, such as the 
U.K.’s Co-Operative Legal Services and Australia's Slater & Gordon.  
Finally, consumerist-competitive regimes are distinguished by the fact that, in addition to regulating 
individual legal service providers, they also regulate the enterprises in which those people work.  Where 
professionalist-autonomy regimes trust in lawyers and assume that lawyers will collectively enforce good 
behaviour, consumerist-competitive regimes do not.  Accordingly, they are more likely to promulgate 
regulations aimed at enhancing firms' ‘ethical infrastructure’ of ‘organisations, policies, and operating 
                                                        
140 Regarding multiple licensing as a regulatory technique, see Joan Brockman, ‘“Fortunate enough to obtain and 
keep the title of profession: ” Self-regulating organizations and the enforcement of professional monopolies’ (1998) 
41 Canadian Public Administration 587, 607-8. 
141 Legal Services Act 2007 (UK), sch 4.  
142 One of the most notable American businesses providing legal services through software programs is Legal 
Zoom. We understand that Legal Zoom often refers to its work as providing legal information but not legal advice. 
See Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology, Inc., 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. 
1999).  Our view is that providing specific information about the law that is uniquely tailored to the individual 
situation of a particular client or consumer constitutes legal advice.   
143 Ibid s. 72. 
144 Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon and Steve Mark, ‘Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management: An Empirical 
Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in New South Wales’ (2010) 37 Journal of Law 
& Society 466, 468. 
145 Andrew Grech and Kirsten Morrison, ‘Slater & Gordon: The Listing Experience’ (2009) 22 Georgetown Journal 
of Legal Ethics 535; Steve Mark, The Future Is Here: Globalisation And The Regulation Of The Legal Profession 
Views From An Australian Regulator (2009) 9.   Other publicly-traded Australian law firms include Integrated Legal 
Holdings (http://www.ilh.com.au). 
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procedures’.146  Much of the firm-based regulation in consumerist-competitive regimes is ‘indirect’—it 
requires leaders within a firm to take responsibility for others.147 However England/Wales and Australia 
have begun to adopt direct firm regulation, which looks beyond the behaviour of individuals and attends 
to the firm itself.  Examples include the obligation to establish a procedure for responding to client 
complaints,148 and Queensland's Workplace Culture Check questionnaire and dialogue process. 149
How should legal services be regulated? 
  
Dominant modes in developed common law countries. 
 
Professionalist-
independent Mode  
Consumerist-
competitive Mode 
Core Values: 
Professionalism of 
Lawyers; 
Independence of 
Lawyers and the Bar 
 
Competition between 
Legal Service 
Providers; Consumer 
Rights 
Occupational Structure: Exclusive Lawyer Occupation(s)  
Multiple Legal 
Occupations 
Governance: Self-Regulation  
Co-Regulation or 
External Regulation 
Regulatory Posture to 
Non-Licensees: 
Insulation of lawyers 
from Non-Licensees  
Tolerance of Non-
Licensees 
Regulatory Focus Regulation of Individual Providers  
Regulation of Firms 
and Individuals 
Geographic Ambit: Anglophone North America 
Rep of Ireland  
Northern Ireland 
N. Zealand   
(in transit between 
modes) 
England + Wales, 
Scotland, Australia 
                                                         
146 Schneyer, ‘Professional Discipline for Law Firms’ (n 124) 10.  See also the definition offered by Christine Parker 
and Lyn Aitken, ‘The Queensland Workplace Culture Check: Learning from Reflection on Ethics inside Law Firms’ 
(2011) 24 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 399-401 note 5: ‘Ethical infrastructure refers to how law firms' 
formal and informal management policies, procedures and controls, work team cultures, and habits of interaction 
and practice influence and constrain ethical practice’. 
147 Dodek, ‘Regulating Law Firms in Canada’ (n 127) 407.  See e.g. Legal Services Act 2007 (UK), ss. 91 and 92. 
148 John Briton and Scott McLean, ‘Incorporated Legal Practices: Dragging the Regulation of the Legal Profession 
into the Modern Era’ (2010) 11 Legal Ethics 241, 252; Legal Services Act 2007 (UK), s. 112.ç 
149 Mark 2-3; Parker and Aitken, ‘The Queensland Workplace Culture Check: Learning from Reflection on Ethics 
inside Law Firms’ (n 146)  407. 
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2.3 Adding Complexity to the Taxonomy: Multiple Strategies, Hybrid Categories, and Unintended 
Consequences 
In Parts 2.1 and 2.2, we have described the professionalist-independent and consumerist-competitive 
frameworks.  In practice, though, regulators rarely employ only one approach.  In this section, we explain 
how the taxonomy sheds light on the complexity of legal services regulation by highlighting the use of 
multiple and hybrid frameworks, as well as the manifestation of unintended results.  
2.3.1 Hybrid Strategies 
The most common hybrid strategies are what we term professionalist-regulated approaches that combine 
professionalist-independent assumptions regarding legal services with external or co-regulation found in 
consumerist-competitive systems or professionalist-competitive approaches that combine professionalist-
independent assumptions with the behavioural framework of the consumerist-competitive model.   
One professionalist-regulated approach is the common law doctrine of malpractice, which regulates 
lawyers through tort and contract doctrines of general application, reflecting a consumerist-competitive 
strategy.  But to the extent that malpractice law relies on the expert testimony of lawyers to define 
lawyers’ duties it employs a professionalist-independent strategy.    
Another common professionalist-regulated strategy is gatekeeping rules which seek to protect third 
parties and the public by requiring lawyers to take steps contrary to the instructions, and possibly the 
interests, of the corporation,150 such as the Sarbanes-Oxley lawyer regulations151 and IRS Circular 230.152 
These gatekeeping rules are consumerist-competitive in that they seek to remedy market failures through 
external regulation of lawyers.  They are professionalist-independent in that, as Sung Hui Kim explains, 
they rely on “’lawyer-exceptionalism’ – the notion that lawyers’ societal function is unique and 
qualitatively different from that of other professionals who have legal obligations to avert fraud.”153  In 
contrast to these professionalist-regulated approaches, other gatekeeping provisions are wholly 
professionalist-independent, such as Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules.154
                                                        
150 William H. Simon, ‘Organizational Representation and the Frontiers of Gatekeeping’ (2011) 19 American 
University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 1067; David B. Wilkins, ‘Making Context Count: 
Regulating Lawyers after Kaye, Scholer’ (1993) 66 Southern California Law Review 1145, n 80.  See also Fred 
Zacharias, ‘Lawyers as Gatekeepers’ (2004) 41 San Diego Law Review 1387 and John Leubsdorf, ‘Legal Ethics 
Falls Apart’ (2009) 57 Buffalo Law Review 959, 972; John C. Coffee Jr., ‘The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda 
for the SEC’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 1293, 1297 offers the following definition: “gatekeepers are 
independent professionals who are so positioned that, if they withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the 
corporation may be unable to effect some transaction or to maintain some desired status.” 
  It would also be possible to 
develop gatekeeping rules wholly within a consumerist-competitive framework, based upon a rationale 
that equates lawyers with fiduciaries generally or that imposes duties because of the tasks lawyers 
perform providing them with access to specific information and an opportunity to prevent wrongdoing, as 
opposed to lawyer exceptionalism. 
151 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002). 
152 http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/Circular-230-Tax-Professionals. 
153 Sung Hui Kim, ‘Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars’ (2010) 63 Southern Methodist University Law 
Review 73, 73. 
154 American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2010)   
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A gatekeeping provision that presents a closer question of classification is Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  Rule 11 applies to lawyers and to clients as would a consumerist-competitive provision, 
although the Rule imposes greater duties on lawyers, as would a professionalist-independent provision.  
Promulgated by courts, as are lawyer regulations under the professionalist-independent mode, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are developed outside of the lawyer regulation framework and require approval 
by Congress.  Because it is court regulation that posits a special role for lawyers, we suggest placing Rule 
11 within the professionalist-independent framework and not the professionalist-regulated category. 
An additional example of a professionalist-regulated approach is California’s regulation of lawyers.  
California is the only United States jurisdiction where the legislature, an external regulator, primarily 
promulgates rules of lawyer conduct.  Yet these rules track professionalist-independent assumptions 
regarding the essentialism of legal services, including the prohibition of multidisciplinary practice.155
Another hybrid framework is professionalist-competitive.  In the State of Washington and the Provinces 
of British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario, for example, there are small notarial and paralegal professions 
which provide legal services in competition with lawyers.
 
156  Similarly, in New York, British Columbia, 
and Nova Scotia, regulations contemplate imposing responsibilities on law firms, 157
2.3.2 Multiple Strategies 
 contrary to the 
professionalist-independent reliance on the accountability of lawyers as individuals. 
Where hybrid strategies combine professionalist-independent and consumerist-competitive elements, 
multiple strategies refer to employment of both professionalist-independent and consumerist-competitive 
strategies in the same jurisdiction.  Indeed, no common-law jurisdiction employs only one regulatory 
strategy.   
In common law North America, laws of general application that apply to lawyers, such as fraud or 
criminal provisions, represent a consumerist-competitive approach even within jurisdictions that generally 
regulate lawyers through professionalist-independent mechanisms.   Similarly, England and Wales retain 
self-regulated entities reflecting a professionalist-independent approach as front-line regulators158
2.3.3 Unintended Consequences 
 that are 
subservient to state-accountable and layperson-dominated bodies.   
Professionalist-independent or consumerist-competitive approaches may sometimes cause very different 
results than what regulators intend.  For example, professionalist-independent regulators in the United 
States reject the possibility of nonlawyers delivering legal services and therefore refuse to encourage 
regulation of nonlawyer legal service providers.  As a result, an increasing number of legal services 
businesses are developing outside of the regulatory regime at both ends of the market, such as Axiom 
(project-based legal work) or Clearspire (virtual law practice) as alternatives to the traditional corporate                                                         
155 California Business & Professions Code Div. 3 - Professions and Vocations Generally, Ch. 4 - Attorneys (Bus. & 
Prof. Code §§ 6000 et seq.) http://rules.calbar.ca.gov/SelectedLegalAuthority/TheStateBarAct.aspx. 
156 Washington Supreme Court Admission to Practice Rule 28, Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians.  Re these small Canadian sub-profesions, see Law Society Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, c L.8, ss. 25.1 
and 25.2; Notaries Act, (British Columbia), RSBC 1996, c. 334; Notaries Act (Quebec), CQLR c N-3. 
157 Adam Dodek, ‘Regulating Law Firms in Canada’ (2011) 90 Canadian Bar Review 383, 404 and 409. 
158 David Clementi, Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England And Wales: Final Report 
(2004).  See also Andrew Boon, ‘Professionalism under the Legal Services Act 2007’ (2010) 17 International 
Journal of the Legal Profession 195. 
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law firm and LegalZoom (online legal forms) or Modria (online dispute resolution) as options for the 
consumer law market.159
Conclusion 
 
We began this project by seeking to gain insight into why common law jurisdictions have adopted 
divergent regulatory strategies.  By placing strategies for regulating legal services in the context of 
rationales for regulation more generally, we identified assumptions regarding the purposes and methods 
of regulations that we classify generally into professionalist-independent frameworks dominant in the 
United States and Canada, and consumerist-competitive frameworks dominant in Australia, England and 
Wales.  These frameworks, in turn, construct particular occupational structures, governance regimes, and 
substantive rules, including limitations on the role of non-licensee service providers.  The taxonomy of 
dominant frameworks also helps identify exceptions to these frameworks, whether they represent hybrid 
or alternate strategies, or unintended consequences.   
A comprehensive normative evaluation of these alternative modes of regulation is beyond the scope of 
this Essay. Competitive-consumerist regulators take the consumer interests of clients more seriously, and 
this approach may produce more accessible and better-quality legal services for individual clients.  
However, others might argue that these regulators have abandoned ancient and worthy ambitions, such as 
instilling altruistic service orientation in lawyers and maintaining a profession independent of state and 
market.  Even among the co-authors of this piece there is disagreement over the preferred regulatory 
regime.  For example, one of us has advocated elsewhere that the American public would benefit from 
increased competitive-consumerist regulation through liberalisation of the nonlawyer ownership and 
investment bans in the United States.160  Another argues more generally that a competitive-consumerist 
approach best promotes the goals of individual rights and equal access to political and economic power.161  
A third believes that sufficiently ambitious reform might bring professionalist-independent regulation into 
the 21st century without jettisoning its core commitments.162
 
  Regardless of our individual normative 
views, there is benefit in crafting a descriptive categorisation of lawyer regulation as we have done here.  
The intention of this taxonomy is to stimulate further inquiry into the assumptions underlying, and 
characteristics of, comparative regulatory regimes, as well as into which assumptions and characteristics 
are appropriate for particular purposes. The taxonomy is designed to aid scholars and regulators alike as 
they evaluate merits of existing regulation and consider proposals for reform.     
WORKS CITED 
Abbott AD, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (University of Chicago 
Press 1988) 
Abel RL, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules? (1981) 59 Texas Law Review 639  
                                                        
159 Renee Newman Knake, ‘Legal Information and the First Amendment,” (2014) Fordham Law Review  
[forthcoming].  Such businesses are at risk for prosecution for the unauthorised practice of law. 
160 Renee Newman Knake, ‘Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services’ (2012) 73 Ohio State Law Journal 1, 
161 Russell G. Pearce and Sinna Nasseri, ‘The Virtue of Low Barriers to Becoming a Lawyer: Promoting Liberal and 
Democratic Values’ (2012) 19 International Journal of the Legal Profession 357-378. 
162 Noel Semple, ‘Justitia’s Legions’ (draft on file with author). 
 26 
--, ‘England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and Solicitors’ in Abel 
RL and Lewis P (eds), Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World (University of California Press, 
1988) 
--, American Lawyers (Oxford University Press 1989) 
--, English Lawyers Between Market and State: The Politics of Professionalism (Oxford University Press 
2003) 
--, Lawyers in the Dock: Learning from Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings (Oxford University Press 
2008) 
Alternative Business Structures Working Group, First Report to Convocation (June 27, 2013), (Toronto: 
Law Society of Upper Canada, 2013)  online: LSUC 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147495044 > accessed 3 December 2013 
American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint 
for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (Report for the ABA Commission on Professionalism 1986) 
American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2010) 
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, The Law Governing Lawyers (American Law 
Institute 2000) 
Arrow KJ, ‘Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care’ (1963) 53 The American Economic 
Review 941. 
Arthurs H, ‘The Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?’ (1995) 33 Alberta 
Law Review 800 
Backhouse C, ‘Gender and Race in the Construction of “Legal Professionalism”: Historical Perspectives’ 
(Paper presented at the First Colloquium on the Legal Profession) 
Barton BH, ‘Why Do We Regulate Lawyers: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and 
Conduct Regulation’ (2001) 33 Arizona State Law Journal 429   
--, ‘An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, 
Legislatures, or the Market?’ (2003) 37 Georgia Law Review 1167   
--, The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
Bassett DL, ‘Redefining the Public Profession’ (2005) 36 Rutgers Law Journal 721  
Birnbaum R and Bala N, ‘Views of Ontario Lawyers on Family Litigants without Representation’ (2012) 
63 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 99 
Bishop W, ‘Regulating the Market for Legal Services in England: Enforced Separation of Function and 
Restrictions on Forms of Enterprise’ (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 326 
Boldrin M and Levine DK, Rent-Seeking And Innovation (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research 
Department Staff Report 347) (2004) 
Boon A, ‘Professionalism under the Legal Services Act 2007’ (2010) 17 International Journal of the 
Legal Profession 195 
Bortolotti B and Fiorentini G, ‘Barriers to Entry and the Self-Regulating Profession: Evidence from the 
Market for Italian Accountants’ in Bortolotti B and Fiorentini G (eds), Organized Interests and Self-
regulation: An Economic Approach (Oxford University Press 1999) 
Bowcott O, ‘Labyrinthine legal services regulation 'needs to be streamlined' (The Guardian, first 
published 10 September 2013)’  www.theguardian.com/law/2013/sep/10/legal-services-board-
labyrinthine-regulation (accessed 23 October 2013). 
Briton J and McLean S, ‘Incorporated Legal Practices: Dragging the Regulation of the Legal Profession 
into the Modern Era’ (2010) 11 Legal Ethics 241 
Brockman J, ‘“Fortunate enough to obtain and keep the title of profession: ” Self-regulating organizations 
and the enforcement of professional monopolies’ (1998) 41 Canadian Public Administration 587 
Burkart G, ‘Professions and Professionalization’ in Harrington A, Marshall BL and Müller H-P (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Social Theory (Routledge 2006) 
Cabrillo F and Fitzpatrick S, The Economics of Courts and Litigation (Edward Elgar 2008) 
 27 
Canadian Bar Association International Practice of Law Committee, Striking a Balance: The Report of 
the International Practice of Law Committee on Multi-Disciplinary Practices and the Legal Profession 
(1999) 
Clementi D, Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England And Wales: Final 
Report (2004) 
Coffee Jr. JC, ‘The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 
1293 
Commission Of The European Communities, Report on Competition in Professional Services (2004) 
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, CCBE Economic Submission To Commission Progress 
Report On Competition In Professional Services (2006) 
<http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/ccbe_economic_submis1_1182239202.pdf> 
5 accessed 3 January 2014 
Cox C and Foster S, The Costs And Benefits Of Occupational Regulation (1990) 
Darby MR and Karni E, ‘Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud’ (1973) 16 Journal of Law 
and Economics 67 
Decker C and Yarrow G, Understanding the Economic Rationale for Legal Services Regulation: A Report 
for the Legal Services Board (2010) 
Denckla DA, ‘Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical 
Parameters’ (1999) 67 Fordham Law Review 2581 
de Tocqueville A, Democracy In America (Adlard and Saunders [1831] 1862) 
Devlin R and Cheng A, ‘Re-Calibrating, Re-Visioning and Re-Thinking Self-Regulation in Canada’ 
(2010) 17 International Journal Of The Legal Profession 233 
Director General of Fair Trading (UK), Competition in Professions (2001) 
Dodek A, ‘Regulating Law Firms in Canada’ (2011) 90 Canadian Bar Review 383 
Dodek AM and others, Canadian Legal Practice: A Guide for the 21st century (LexisNexis Canada 2009) 
Durkheim E, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Brookfield Ctr, Routledge, [1890] 1992) 
Dzienkwoski JS and Peroni RJ, ‘Multidisciplinary Practice and the Legal Profession: A Market Approach 
to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century’ (2000) 69 Fordham Law 
Review 83 
Fenn P and McGuire A, ‘The Assessment: The Economics of Legal Reform’ (1994) 10 Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 1 
Fried C, ‘The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship’ (1976) 85 
Yale Law Journal 1060 
Friedman M, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press [1962] 2002) 
Freidson E, Professionalism: The Third Logic (Polity Press 2001) 
Gordon RW, ‘The Independence of Lawyers’ (1988) 68 Boston University Law Review 1 
Graham RN, Legal Ethics: Theories, Cases, and Professional Regulation (2nd ed, Emond Montgomery 
Publications 2011) 
Grech A and Morrison K, ‘Slater & Gordon: The Listing Experience’ (2009) 22 Georgetown Journal of 
Legal Ethics 535 
Green BA, ‘Lawyers’ Professional Independence:  Overrated or Undervalued?’ (2013) 46 Akron Law 
Review 599 
Greenstein RK, ‘Against Professionalism’ (2009) 22 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 327 
Hadfield GK, ‘The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System’ (2000) 98 
Michigan Law Review 953 
--‘Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control Over Corporate 
Legal Markets,’ (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1689 
Hazard G, Pearce R, and Stempel J, ‘Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis 
of Legal Services,’ (1983) 58 New York University Law Review 1084 
Johnson T, Professions and Power (Macmillan 1972) 
 28 
Kaye RP, ‘Regulated (Self-)Regulation: A New Paradigm for Controlling the Professions?’ (2006) 21 
Public Policy and Administration 105 
Kim SH, ‘Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars’ (2010) 63 Southern Methodist University 
Law Review 73 
--, ‘Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping’ (2011) 63 Florida Law Review 
129 
Kleiner MM, Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? (W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research 2006) 
Kleiner MM and Ham H, Regulating Occupations: Does Occupational Licensing Increase Earnings and 
Reduce Employment Growth? (2005) 
Knake RN, ‘Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services’ (2012) 73 Ohio State Law Journal 1 
--, ‘Legal Information and the First Amendment’ (2014) Fordham Law Review [forthcoming] 
Larson MS, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (University of California Press, 1977) 
Law Society of British Columbia, ‘Public Consultations in Vancouver, Victoria and Prince George on 
Future of Legal Regulation’ (Press Release, 5 September 2013) 
www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=3811&t=Public-consultations-in-Vancouver,-Victoria-and-Prince-
George-on-future-of-legal-regulation> last accessed 5 November 2013 
Leffler KB, ‘Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American Medicine’ (1978) 21 Journal 
of Law and Economics 165 
Leland HE, ‘Quacks, Lemons and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards’ (1979) 87 
Journal of Political Economy 1328 
Leubsdorf J, ‘Legal Ethics Falls Apart’ (2009) 57 Buffalo Law Review 959 
Luban D, ‘Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm’ (1995) 83 Georgetown Law Journal 2619 
Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Regulating Professions and Occupations (Manitoba Law 
Commission 1994) 
Mark S, The Future Is Here: Globalisation And The Regulation Of The Legal Profession Views From An 
Australian Regulator (2009) 
Maurizi A, ‘Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest’ (1974) 82 Journal of Political Economy 399 
Maute JL, ‘Global Continental Shifts to a New Governance Paradigm in Lawyer Regulation and 
Consumer Protection: Riding the Wave’ in Mortensen R, Bartlett F and Tranter K (eds), Alternative 
Perspectives on Lawyers and Legal Ethics: Reimagining the Profession (Routledge 2010) 
Moliterno JE, The American Legal Profession in Crisis: Resistance and Responses to Change (Oxford 
2013) 
Moore NJ, ‘Professionalism Reconsidered’ (1987) 1987 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 773 
Moorhead R, Sherr A and Paterson A, ‘Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in 
England and Wales’ (2003) 37 Law & Society Review 765 
Newton LH, ‘Professionalization: The Intractable Plurality of Values’ in Wade L. Robisen et al. (eds), 
Profits and Professions: Essays in Business and Professional Ethics (Humana Press 1983) 
Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, "2013 – 2016 Strategic Framework," online: 
<http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/cms/menu-pdf/strategicframework.pdf> accessed 3 December 2013 
Núnez J, ‘Can Self Regulation Work?: A Story of Corruption, Impunity and Cover-Up’ (2007) 31 Journal 
of Regulatory Economics 209 
Ogus AI, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon Press 1994) 
--, ‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97 
Pagliero M, ‘What is the Objective of Professional Licensing? Evidence from the US Market for Lawyers’ 
(2011) 29 International Journal of Industrial Organization 473 
Parker C, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice (Oxford University Press 1999) 
--, ‘Regulation of the Ethics of Australian Legal Practice: Autonomy and Responsiveness’ (2002) 25 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 676 
Parker C and Aitken L, ‘The Queensland Workplace Culture Check: Learning from Reflection on Ethics 
inside Law Firms’ (2011) 24 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 399 
 29 
Parker C, Gordon T and Mark S, ‘Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management: An Empirical Assessment of 
an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in New South Wales’ (2010) 37 Journal of Law and 
Society 466 
Paton PD, ‘Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, And Reviving The MDP 
Debate In America’ (2010) 78 Fordham Law Review 2193 
Paterson I, Fink M and Ogus A, Economic Impact of Regulation in the Field of Liberal Professions in 
Different Member States (Study for the European Commission, DG Competition) (2003) 
Pearce R, ‘The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve The 
Conduct And Reputation Of The Bar’ (1995) 70 New York University Law Review 1229 
Pearce RG, ‘How Law Firms Can Do Good While Doing Well (And The Answer Is Not Pro Bono)’ 
(2005) 33 Fordham Urban Law Journal 211 
Pearce RG and Nasseri S, ‘The Virtue of Low Barriers to Becoming a Lawyer: Promoting Liberal and 
Democratic Values’ (2012) 19 International Journal of the Legal Profession 357 
Pearce RG and Wald E, ‘Rethinking Lawyer Regulation: How a Relational Approach Would Improve 
Professional Rules and Roles’ (2012) 2012 Michigan State Law Review 513 
Pound R, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modem Times: With Reference to the Development of Bar 
Associations in the United States’ (West Publishing Co. 1953) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Economic Value of Legal Aid: Analysis in Relation to Commonwealth Funded 
Matters with a Focus on Family Law (2009) 
Pue WW, ‘Becoming “Ethical”: Lawyers’ Professional Ethics in Early Twentieth Century Canada’ (1991) 
20 Manitoba Law Journal 237 
--, University of Manitoba, and Canadian Legal History Project, Lawyers and the Constitution of Political 
Society: Containing Radicalism and Maintaining Order in Prairie Canada, 1900-1930 (Faculty of Law, 
University of Manitoba 1993) 
Remus DA, ‘Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships’ (2011) 30 Yale Law & Policy Review 
123 
Rhode DL, ‘Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of 
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions’ (1981) 34 Stanford Law Review 1 
--, ‘Professionalism In Perspective: Alternative Approaches To Nonlawyer Practice’ (1996) 22 New York 
University Review of Law and Social Change 701 
--, Access to Justice (Oxford University Press 2004) 
--, ‘Moral Counseling’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1317 
--, Professional Regulation and Public Service: An Unfinished Agenda’ in Cummings SL (ed), The  
--, ‘Reforming American Legal Practice and Legal Education: Rethinking the Role of Nonlawyers in 
Delivering and Financing Legal Services,’ (2014) Legal Ethics [forthcoming].   
Rhode DL and Woolley A, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer Regulation: An Agenda for Reform in 
the United States and Canada’ (2012) 80 Fordham Law Review 2761 
Paradox of Professionalism: Lawyers and the Possibility of Justice (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
Ribstein LE, ‘Ethical Rules Agency Costs and Law Firm Structure’ (1998) 84 Virginia Law Review 1707 
--, ‘Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing’ (2004) 69 Missouri Law Review 299 
Schneyer T, ‘Professional Discipline for Law Firms’ (1991) 77 Cornell Law Review 1 
--, ‘A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure" of Law 
Firms’ (1998) 39 South Texas Law Review 245 
--, ‘Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and Australian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in 
Regulating Law Practice’ (2009) 2009 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 13 
Semple N, Core Values: Professionalism and Independence Theories in Lawyer Regulation (2013) 
--, Justitia’s Legions, (draft on file with author) 
Seneviratne M, ‘Joint Regulation of Consumer Complaints in Legal Services: A Comparative Study’ 
(2001) 29 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 311 
Shaked A and Sutton J, ‘The Self-Regulating Profession’ (1981) 47 Review of Economic Studies 217 
 30 
Sherr A, ‘The "Control" Orthodoxy in England and Wales – A Retrospective Review’ (2009) 16 
International Journal of the Legal Profession 153 
Sherwin EL, ‘Legal Taxonomy’ (2009) 15 Legal Theory 25 
Shinnick E, Bruinsma F and Parker C, ‘Aspects of Regulatory Reform in the Legal Profession: Australia, 
Ireland and the Netherlands’ (2003) 10 International Journal of the Legal Profession 237 
Simon WH, ‘Organizational Representation and the Frontiers of Gatekeeping’ (2011) 19 American 
University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 1069 
Smith A, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) 
Solomon RL, ‘Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism 1925-1960’ in Robert L Nelson 
et  al. (eds.), Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession 
(Cornell University Press 1992)  
Spiegler R, ‘The Market for Quacks’ (2006) 73 The Review of Economic Studies 1113 
Stephen F, Lawyers, Markets and Regulation (Edward Elgar 2013) 
Stephen FH and Love JH, ‘5860: Regulation of the Legal Profession’ in Bouckaert B and Geest GD (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (1999) <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5860book.pdf > accessed 3 
January 2014  
Stephen FH, ‘Regulation of the Legal Professions or Regulation of Markets for Legal Services: Potential 
Implications of the Legal Services Act 2007’ (2008) 19 European Business Law Review 1130 
--, ‘Report of Further Research on the Law Society of Scotland Guarantee Fund (Manchester and Edinburgh: 
Economy and Global Governance Institute for Law & Scottish Legal Complaints Commission 2011)  
<www.scottishlegalcomplaints.com/media/13781/11%2007%2018%20uofm%20gf%20report%20final.pdf> 
accessed 15 November 2013 
Stigler GJ, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics 3 
Terry LS, ‘The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as “Service 
Providers”,’ (2008) 2008 ABA Journal of the Professional Lawyer 189 
--‘The European Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services’ (2009) 29 Northwestern 
Journal of International Law and Business 1 
--, ‘Transnational Legal Practice (International)’ (2013) 47 International Lawyer 485 
Terry LS, Mark S and Gordon T, ‘Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession’ (2012) 80 Fordham 
Law Review 2661 
Timmermans S, ‘Professions and Their Work: Do Market Shelters Protect Professional Interests?’ (2008) 
35 Work and Occupations 164 
Tollison RD, ‘Rent Seeking: A Survey’ (1982) 35 Kyklos International Review for Social Sciences 575 
Trebilcock MJ, Tuohy CJ and Wolfson AD, Professional Regulation: A Staff Study of Accountancy, 
Architecture, Engineering and Law in Ontario Prepared for the Professional Organization Committee 
(Ministry of the Attorney General 1979) 
Van den Bergh R and Montangie Y, ‘Competition in Professional Services Markets: Are Latin Notaries 
Different?’ (2006) 2 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 189 
Wald E, ‘Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of 
Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms’ (2010) 78 Fordham Law Review 2245 
--, ‘Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?’ (2010) 42 McGeorge Law Review 149 
Webb D, ‘Are Lawyers Regulatable?’ (2008) 5 Alberta Law Review 233 
Webb J, ‘The Dynamics of Professionalism: The Moral Economy of English Legal Practice - and Some 
Lessons for New Zealand’ (2008) 16 Waikato Law Review 21 
--, ‘Regulating Lawyers in a Liberalized Legal Services Market: The Role of Education and Training’ 
(2013) 24 Stanford Law and Policy Review 533 
Weber M, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Roth G and Wittich C eds, 
Fischoff and others trs, Bedminster Press, [1922] 1968) 
Wilkins DB, ‘Who Should Regulate Lawyers?’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 799 
--, ‘Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers after Kaye, Scholer’ (1993) 66 Southern California Law 
Review 1145 
Witz A, Professions and Patriarchy (Routledge, 1992) 
 31 
Woolley A, ‘Imperfect Duty: Lawyers' Obligation to Foster Access to Justice’ (2008) 45 Alberta Law 
Review 107 
--, ‘Regulation in Practice’ (2012) 15 Legal Ethics 243 
--, ‘Why do we Regulate Lawyers?’ in Blaikie DL, Cromwell T and Pink D (eds), Why Good Lawyers 
Matter (Irwin Law Inc. 2012 ) 
Zacharias F, ‘Lawyers as Gatekeepers’ (2004) 41 San Diego Law Review 1387 
Zacharias FC, ‘The Myth of Self-Regulation’ (2009) 93 Minnesota Law Review 1147 
   
